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: Case No.: 95Q665-CA 
: Priority No.: 2 
BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to this 
CourtTs order, dated December 7, 1995, allowing the interlocutory 
appeal. Rule 5, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure; Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-35-26 (2) (c) (1953 as amended) . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE. 
Petitioner, Larry Helquist, is charged with Driving Under 
The Influence, a class "A" misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 41-6-44 (1)(3)(a)(ii)(E) (1953 as amended). 
This appeal is from the trial court's order, dated October 
2, 1995, denying Defendant's suppression motion. The trial court 
was the Seventh Judicial District Court, in and for San Juan 
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Lyle R. Anderson, presiding. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS. 
1. On June 7, 1995, Mr. Helquist was charged in an 
Information with Driving Under the Influence, a class "A" 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 
(3) (a) (ii) (b) . 
2. On July 7, 1995, Mr. Helquist was arraigned and entered 
a plea of not guilty. 
3. On July 31, 1995, Mr. Helquist filed a motion to 
suppress evidence. A copy of that motion is contained in 
Addendum B. 
4. On September 5, 1995, an evidentiary hearing was held on 
Mr. Helquistfs motion to suppress evidence. 
5. On October 2, 1995, the motion to suppress evidence was 
denied. A copy of the District Courtfs Findings of Fact is 
contained in Addendum C. 
6.. On October 23, 1995, Mr. Helquist filed a Petition for 
Permission to Appeal from an Interlocutory Order. 
7. On December 7, 1995, the Petition for Permission to 
Appeal from the Interlocutory Order was granted by this Court. 
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C. DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW. 
The District Court has stayed proceedings pending the 
outcome of this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED 
1) Did the troopers seize Mr, Helquist without reasonable 
suspicion that criminal activity was afoot? 
A. Did the dispatch report provide a sufficient factual 
basis?; 
B. Did the troopers exceed the scope of any permissible 
detention?; and 
C. Did the troopers' actions constitute an arrest without 
probable cause? 
Legal determinations regarding reasonable suspicion made by 
the trial court are to be broadly reviewed for correctness, with 
the Appellate Court affording a measure of discretion to the 
trial court in the application of the correctness standard. 
State v. Chapman, P.2d , 272 Utah Adv. Rep. 6 (Utah 
1995); State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-40 (Utah 1994). 
Legal determinations regarding probable cause are to be 
reviewed for correctness conveying some discretion to the trial 
court. State v. Poole, 871 P.2d 531, 533 (Utah 1994). 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Mr. Helquist was stopped by troopers after the San Juan 
County Sheriff's Dispatch received an anonymous call from an 
employee at Blue Mountain Foods who reported a "drunk driver", 
stating that a male who smelled strongly of alcohol had been in 
an argument, left the store and was seen in a small red car. (R. 
5, 6, 13) There was no testimony regarding the time between when 
the call was received by dispatch and when the law enforcement 
arrived at the scene other than Trooper Halls1 statement that it 
was "not that long". (R. 13) Trooper Randall and a ride-along 
initially responded to the call and drove by Blue Mountain Foods. 
(R. 6) Trooper Randall testified that there was only one red car 
in the parking lot at that time. (R. 6) 
When Trooper Randall turned around to go back to Blue 
Mountain Foods, his vehicle became stuck in a snowdrift and 
Trooper Halls, at Trooper Randall's request, responded to the 
report. (R. 6-7) Trooper Halls stopped up the street from Blue 
Mountain Foods and watched Mr. Helquist as walked to a small red 
car, got in, backed out of the parking stall and headed toward 
the street. (R. 13) There was no testimony that Trooper Halls 
observed anything unusual about Mr. Helquist1s gait or that Mr.1 
Helquist had any problems operating the vehicle. 
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Trooper Halls stopped the vehicle before it left the parking 
lot, (R. 13) Trooper Halls asked the Mr. Helquist to get out 
of the car and noticed that he smelled strongly of alcohol and 
had somewhat slurred speech. (R. 14 ) A short time later, 
Trooper Randall arrived and smelled a strong odor of alcohol on 
Mr. Helquist. (R. 8) Trooper Randall questioned Mr. Helquist 
about the consumption of alcohol and discussed with him the 
decision to transport him to the public safety building for the 
field sobriety tests and during the field sobriety test, 
discussed some of his medical conditions. (R. 7, 8, 9) Trooper 
Randall characterized Mr. Helquistfs speech as good. (R. 10) 
Trooper Randall told Mr. Helquist to get into his police 
vehicle as he was going to be transported to the public safety 
building for a field sobriety test. Mr. Helquist objected. (R. 
8, 33) Trooper Randall stated that the reason for having the 
field sobriety test done at the public safety building was due to 
the weather conditions: it was a snowy night and he wanted to 
make sure the test was performed under fair conditions. (R. 8) 
Trooper Halls stayed with the vehicle until the troopers 
determined what to do with the it. (R. 35, 49) After the field 
sobriety tests, Trooper Randall called Trooper Halls and told him 
to call a wrecker and impound the vehicle. (R. 35) 
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Trooper Randall had filled out the DUI report form which 
indicated that the search of the vehicle was conducted at the 
place of arrest. (R. 29) The place of arrest was listed as Blue 
Mountain Foods. (R. 30) The time of arrest was listed on the 
report as 5:30 and the stop was supposed to have taken place at 
the same time. (R. 31) 
The Court took judicial notice that the public safety 
building was five blocks away from the stop and that there were 
other places where the field sobriety test could have been 
performed. (R. 46) \ 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court incorrectly concluded that there was 
sufficient reasonable suspicion to justify the stop of Mr. 
Helquist. The arresting officers relied on the conclusory 
dispatch report and never observed any driving pattern which 
would corroborate the allegation that Mr. Helquist was an 
impaired driver. Furthermore, the troopers exceeded any 
permissible detention by transporting Mr. Helquist to the public 
safety building for the field sobriety test. 
The trial court incorrectly concluded that putting Mr. 
Helquist in the patrol car and taking to the public safety 
building, over his objection, was a permissible extension of a 
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Terry stop. In actuality, it was a de facto arrest requiring 
probable cause. 
ARGUMENT 
1. THE TROOPERS SEIZED MR. HELQUIST WITHOUT HAVING A 
REASONABLE ARTICULABLE SUSPICION THAT CRIMINAL ACTIVITY WAS 
AFOOT. 
A. THE DISPATCH REPORT WAS CONCLUSORY AND WAS NOT 
CORROBORATED BY TROOPER HALLTS PERSONAL OBSERVATIONS. 
In State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1994), the Utah 
Supreme Court adopted the two prong test set forth in Terry v. 
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20, 20 L.Ed 2d 889, 88 S.Ct. 1868 (1968) to 
determine whether a routine traffic stop can withstand 
constitutional scrunity: 
(1) Was the police officer's action 
"justified at its inception"? 
(2) Was the resulting detention 
"reasonably related in scope to the 
circumstances that justified the 
interference in the first place"? 
(citation omitted) . 
IsLuf 873 P.2d at 1131-32. 
As to the first inquiry of the test, the trooper's action 
was not justified at its inception. There was no underlying 
factual justification for the conclusion that Mr. Helquist was 
driving under the influence. The only factual information 
provided was by an anonymous caller from Blue Mountain Foods who 
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stated that a male smelled strongly of alcohol, had been in an 
argument at the store, and was in a small red car. No 
information was given in support of the conclusion that he was 
drunk, such as allegations that the individual had slurred 
speech, bloodshot eyes, unsteady balance or was staggering, 
etcetera. There was no testimony as to the time that the call 
was received by Dispatch and when the trooper's responded. 
Moreover, Trooper Hall's observed Mr. Helquist when he 
walked to his vehicle, got in and backed out of the parking 
stall. Trooper Halls noted absolutely no behavior consistent 
with Mr. Helquist being "drunk". 
In Sandy City v. Thorsness, 778 P.2d 1011 (Utah App. 1989), 
the defendant drove by the scene of a traffic stop and stopped to 
observe it. The officer waved him on. The defendant hesitated 
momentarily before leaving at a slow rate of speed. The officer 
then followed the defendant who was driving twenty-miles-per-hour 
in a forty-mile-per-hour zone. The officer did not observe any 
suspicious driving or any traffic violations (no traffic was 
impeded). Id. at 1012. This Court held that the stop was not 
based on reasonable suspicion, holding that such suspicion "must 
be based on articulated "objective" facts apparent to the 
officer." Id^ at 1011 
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Here, there were no 'objective facts apparent1 to Trooper 
Halls that Mr. Helquist was under the influence. His gait was 
unremarkable: he was not staggering or exhibiting a loss of 
balance. Likewise, Mr. Helquist apparently had no difficulty 
getting in his car, starting it, or backing it out of the parking 
stall. Finally, no traffic violations were observed. 
That the trooper was responding to a tip does not 
automatically give him the sufficient reasonable suspicion to 
stop the vehicle, especially when the only testimony about the 
time between receiving the tip and responding to it was 
ambiguous. Furthermore, the dispatch report lacked the necessary 
factual basis to justify the stop. 
In State v. Case, 884 P.2d 1274 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), this 
Court held without a factual basis, the officer lacked the 
requisite reasonable suspicion necessary to stop the vehicle. 
Id. at 1280. 
There, the arresting officer relied on a dispatch call to 
investigate a specific location of a possible car prowl or car 
burglary. The suspect was described as "male with a chunky 
build, possibly Hispanic, wearing a white tee shirt". Id. at 
1275• The officer stopped the defendant in the same area of the 
possible car prowl or car burglary and the defendant fit the 
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description given by dispatch. During the stop, the officer 
smelled the odor of alcohol and the defendant was arrested for 
driving under the influence of alcohol. Id. 
The trial court held that sufficient reasonable suspicion 
existed on the basis of the following findings: the dispatch 
reported a alleged crime of a car prowl, a specific location for 
the car prowl and a description of the suspect. Id. at 1278. 
This Court held that "the findings wholly fail to establish the 
department's reasonable, articulable suspicion to issue the 
"possible car prowl" bulletin." Id. 
Likewise, the information provided by the caller in the 
instant case lacked the objective facts to justify the stop of 
the vehicle. All that the anonymous caller offered in support 
of the conclusion that Mr. Helquist was drunk was that he had 
the odor of alcohol about him and he had been in an argument. No 
objective information was offered in support of the conclusion 
such as slurred speech, bloodshot eyes, staggering or unsteady 
balance. Furthermore, the caller failed to provide established 
I 
credibility or some other indication of reliability. 
In State v. Roth, 827 P.2d 255 (Utah App. 1992), this Court 
upheld a stop of a suspected drunk driver on the basis of the 
information provided to dispatch and the arresting officer's 
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observations. There, the defendant was at a hospital and was 
observed by two security officers: he got "vocal" with a 
hospital employee, his eyes were glazed, his speech was slurred, 
he smelled strongly of alcohol and he had trouble standing. Id. 
at 256. One of the security officers followed the defendant out 
to the parking lot and watched him get into a red Pontiac Fiero 
where the defendant repeatedly try to start the vehicle, drove a 
few feet before stalling and then jerked to a stop. Id. at 256. 
The security officers contacted dispatch with this information 
and two police officers were dispatched to investigate. The 
arresting police officer independently observed the following: 
the defendant appeared to be having a hard time driving and his 
driving was slow and jerky. The stop was upheld: 
Officer Bradford had reasonable suspicion to 
make the stop of Roth's vehicle. Where, as 
here, a reliable source with reasonable 
suspicion based on articulable facts reports 
the commission of an offense, based on 
relayed facts, the dispatcher communicates 
the information to police and the responding 
officer's own observations corroborate the 
dispatch, we find that reasonable suspicion 
exists for the stop. 
Id. at 258-59 (emphasis added) 
The case at hand stands in sharp contrast to Roth. Here, 
there is no indication of the reliability of the caller. There 
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was no factual information given in support of the allegation 
that Mr. Helquist was drunk other than he was in some type of an 
argument with another person and smelled of alcohol. There was 
no description of the type of vehicle other than a "small red 
car". Other than this call, the officers had no reason to stop 
and detain the Defendant. Indeed, the Trooper Hall's 
observations of Mr. Helquist absolutely failed to corroborate the 
tip that Mr. Helquist was under the influence. See also Layton 
City v. Noon, 736 P.2d 1035 (Utah App. 1987)(Employee of Circle K 
Store observed Defendant and reported him as intoxicated. When 
officer arrived, his observations corroborated tip that Defendant 
was impaired. The stop was upheld.) 
B. THE TROOPERS EXCEEDED THE SCOPE OF ANY PERMISSIBLE 
DETENTION, i 
Assuming arguendo, that the troopers could detain Mr. 
Helquist, the detention must, nevertheless, be reasonable and 
justifiable in scope to pass constitutional muster. Terry, 392 
U.S. at 20. Even a momentary detention is not permissible 
without reasonable suspicion and objective facts to justify such 
detention. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553-59, 64 
L.Ed.2d 497, 100 S.Ct. 1870 (1980). In the case at hand, the 
troopers1 actions went beyond that which is authorized in a 
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"Terry" stop. 
It is well established that a "Terry" stop is a "brief, on-
the-spot stop on the street"- Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 
209, 60 L.Ed. 824, 833, 99 S.Ct. 2248 (1979)1. The investigating 
officer is under an obligation to quickly confirm or dispel his 
suspicions. Florida v. Rover, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 75 L.Ed. 229, 
103 S.Ct. 1319 (1983)("an investigative detention must be 
temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the 
purpose of the stop"). Transporting Mr. Helquist to the public 
safety building exceeded the permissible limits of a "Terry" 
stop. 
Although the Court took judicial notice that the public 
safety building was five blocks away from the stop, the Court 
also recognized that there were other places, closer to the stop 
where the field sobriety tests could have been performed. That 
the Court found the trooperfs actions in this case reasonable is 
not sufficient to extend a "Terry" stop into anything longer than 
an on-the-spot investigation: 
[R]espondent urges us to adopt a multifactor 
]In Dunaway. the police officers unsuccessfully attempted to justify picking up a murder 
suspect from his home, taking him to a police station and interrogating him on the basis that 
it was an investigatory detention supported by reasonable suspicion. 
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balancing test of "reasonable police conduct 
under the circumstances" to cover all 
seizures that do no amount to technical 
arrests. But the protections intended by the 
Framers could all too easily disappear in the 
consideration and balancing of the 
multifarious circumstances presented by 
different cases, especially when that 
balancing may be done in the first instance 
by police officers engaged in the "often 
competitive enterprise of ferreting out 
crime." A single familiar standard is 
essential to guide police officers, who have 
only limited time and expertise to reflect on 
and balance the social and individual 
involved in the specific circumstances they 
confront. 
Id. 442 U.S. at 213-14, 60 L.Ed at 836 (citations and footnotes 
omitted; emphasis added) 
Thus, the detention in this case "lasted longer than 
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop". State v. 
Robinson, 797 P.2d 431, 435 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), disagreed with 
on other grounds, Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1134 n.3. The seizure of 
Mr. Helquist was unreasonable under Article 1, Section 14 of the 
Utah Constitution and the Fourth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution. All evidence seized as the fruit of the unlawful 
continued detention must be suppressed. Wong Sun v. United 
States, 371 U.S. 471, 488, 833 S.Ct. 407, 417-18, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 
(1963); State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 786 (Utah 1991). 
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2. THE TROOPER'S ACTIONS CONSTITUTED A DE FACTO ARREST. 
Assuming arguendo sufficient reasonable suspicion existed to 
justify the investigatory detention and the detention was not 
unreasonably delayed, the officers actions constituted a de facto 
arrest, absent a showing of probable cause. 
A "Terry" stop would permit the officers to conduct a field 
sobriety test at the scene, however anything beyond a brief and 
narrowly-defined intrusion constitutes an arrest which must be 
supported by probable cause. See generally Dunway v. New York, 
442 U.S. 200, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 2254, 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979). 
The reasoning in Salt Lake City v. earner, 664 P.2d 1168 
(Utah 1983) is applicable in the instant case. There, the Utah 
Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether the administration 
of field sobriety tests violated the defendant's right against 
self-incrimination. In holding that it did not, the Court stated 
as follows: 
Where the field sobriety tests were requested 
and taken in a public street, no indicia of 
arrest such as readied handcuffs, locked 
doors or drawn guns were present when 
defendant was asked to perform the tests, and 
the length of performance of test was only 
minutes, setting was not "custodial", even 




In the case at hand, the field sobriety tests were not taken 
m a public street and the indicia of arrest was present. Mr. 
Helquist was placed in a patrol car by the trooper and taken, 
over his objection, to the public safety building. Such actions 
are consistent with arrest and not with a brief, investigatory 
stop. 
An arrest is a "level three" seizure which requires 
"probable cause to believe an offense has been or is being 
committed". State v. Dietitian, 739 P.2d 616, 617-18 (Utah 1987) 
quoting United Stated v. Merritt, 736 P.2d 223, 230 (5th Cir. 
1984). 
At that time Mr. Helquist was transported, the facts and 
the circumstances known to the officers did not rise to the level 
of probable cause: Trooper Hall's observations of Mr. Helquist 
did not indicate that he was under the influence or impaired. 
After stopping Mr. Helquist, Trooper Halls noted the odor of 
alcohol and slurred speech. Trooper Randall noted only the smell 
of alcohol. While this may have given the troopers a strong 
reason to suspect that Mr. Helquist was impaired, it did not 
rise to the level of probable cause to arrest, especially in 
light of Trooper Hall's earlier observations of Mr. Helquist. 
£££ Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 213-14, 60 L.Ed at 836 ("common rumor 
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or report, suspicion, or even 'strong reason to suspect' [is] not 
adequate to support a warrant for arrest") (citations omitted) 
The officer's claim that this was done solely for the 
purpose of ensuring a fair field sobriety test is disingenuous: 
the field sobriety test could have been done closer to the stop* 
Finally, the DUI report form, written by Trooper Randall, 
indicated that the search of the vehicle was done at the scene of 
the arrest, "Blue Mountain Foods", Trooper Randall estimated the 
time of the stop at being around 5:30, the same time that the he 
wrote in the report that the arrest took place* Therefore, the 
trooper openly admitted to making an arrest. 
The arrest of Mr. Helquist was illegal under Article 1, 
Section 14 of the Utah Constitution and the Fourth Amendment of 
the United States Constitution. All evidence seized as the fruit 
of the unlawful arrest must be suppressed. Wong Sun v. United 
States, 371 U.S. 471, 488, 833 S.Ct. 407, 417-18, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 
(1963); State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 786 (Utah 1991). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse the 
trial court's ruling on the motion to suppress evidence* 
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ADDENDUM A: CONSTITUTIONAL AND 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
TEXT OF CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah provides; 
Sec. 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden-
Issuance of warrant.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches 
and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall 
issue but upon probable case supported by oath or 
affirmation, particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the person or thing to be seized. 
Amendment IV to the Constitution of the United States provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches 
and seizures shall not be violated; and no Warrants shall 
issue but upon probable case supported by Oath or 
affirmation, particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the person or thing to be seized. 
Utah Code Ann. §41-6-44 (1)(ii)(3)(a)(ii)(B) provides: 
(1) (a) A person may not operate or be in actual physical 
control of a vehicle within this state if the person: 
(ii) is under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or the 
combined influence of alcohol and any drug to a degree 
that renders the person incapable of safely operating a 
vehicle. 
(3) (a) A person convicted the first or second time of a 
violation of Subsection (1) is guilty of a: 
(ii) class A misdemeanor if the person: 
(B) had a person under 16 years of age in the vehicle at 
the time of the offense. 
ADDENDUM B: DEFENDANTS MOTION 
TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE 
R o s a l i e R e i l l y #6637 . iVEHTHD^Tr.CTXUv 
148 South Main #9 r^nJ.r;C::r / 
Pos t O f f i c e Box 404 
M o n t i c e l l o , Utah 84535 -'L^ D JUL 3 1 1S95 
(801) 587-3266 
CLilrt ixOr t V . i J w u h j 
Attorney for Defendant '3Y ,^
 v 
LARRY HELQUIST 
IN AND FOR THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH * MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
Plaintiff, * EVIDENCE; REQUEST 
* FOR HEARING 
vs. * 
* Case No, 9577-$7 
LARRY HELQUIST, * Judge Lyle R. Anderson 
Defendant. * 
Pursuant to Rule 12 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
Defendant, Larry Helquist, by and through his attorney of record, 
Rosalie Reilly, hereby moves this Court for an Order to suppress 
all evidence and statements obtained in violation of the Fourth and 
Fifth Amendments of the United States Constitution and Article I, 
Sections 7 and 14 of the Utah Constitution, to wit: 
1. The observations of any police officer after the initial 
automobile stop, including, but not limited to, the observations 
made during the search of the vehicle, and/or of his person; 
2. Any statements attributed to Defendant; and 
3. All tangible evidence seized as the result of the search. 
See State v. Larocco. 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990). 
Defendant further moves for a hearing on this matter• 
DATED this ctfll^r day of July, 1995 
Respe lly submitted, 
R0£ALIE REILL1 
itorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I hand-delivered a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing to Craig Halls at^the Public Safety Building 
located at 297 South Main, in Monpicellb, Utah, on this 3^)^ day 
of July, 1995. 
^LIE REILLY 
;orney for Defendant 
ADDENDUM C: FINDINGS OF FACT 
CRAIG C. HALLS #1317 
San J u a n County A t t o r n e y "^^SanlJanCoVntV 
P . 0 . Box 850 
M o n t i c e l l o , Utah 84535 
Phone 587-2128 HLEO Q C T - ^ 4 ^ 
CLERK OF THE CGUBT 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT SY. 
IN AND FOR SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH Depj:/ 
STATE OF UTAH * 
Plaintiff, * FINDINGS OF FACT 
vs. 
LARRY HELQUIST, * Criminal No. 95 57-11 
Defendant(s). 
This matter came on as a Motion to Suppress before the Seventh 
Judicial District Court on the 5th day of September, 1995* The 
State was represented by the San Juan County Atrorney, Craig C. 
Halls, defendant was present and represented by Rose Reilly. 
The Court having received testimony of the witnesses does 
hereby enter the following Findings of Fact. 
1. The incident giving rise to this action took place on the 
7th day of January, 1995. 
2. That day was a snowy stormy day in Monticello, Ut. 
3. Employees of Blue Mountain Foods, a food store within 
Monticello, Ut. contacted the San Juan County Sheriff's Office and 
indicated that an individual later identified as Larry Helquist had 
an argument with a store employee and was believed to be 
intoxicated. The individual was with a child. 
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4. Store employees called the Sheriff's Office and requested 
that the individual be stopped but asked that he not be confronted 
in Blue Mountain Foods. 
5. The store employee described the person and also the car 
in which he was driving as a small red toyota. 
6. Trooper Sanford Randall responded to Blue Mountain Foods. 
Drove by the parking lot and observed there were only a couple of 
cars in the lot and observed a red toyota vehicle. 
7. Trooper Randall went down to the end of the block to turn 
around an became stuck. 
8. He radioed Sgt. Doug Hall that he would not be able to 
check out the report until he could get out. 
9. Trooper Hall proceed to Blue Mountain Foods and found 
Larry Helguist about to pull out of the parking lot in a small red 
toyota car with a child. 
10. Officer Hall testified that when he approached Mr. 
Helquist he could smell the odor of alcohol and that Mr. Helquist 
had slurred speech. 
11. A short time later Trooper Randall came to the scene and 
Officer Hall turned over the investigation to Trooper Randall. 
12. Trooper Randall could smell the odor of alcohol on the 
breath of Mr. Helquist. 
13. The parking lot at Blue Mountain Foods was covered with 
slush and snow and the Blue Mountain Foods person who had turned in 
the complaint had ask that the individual not be confronted within 
the store. 
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14. Trooper Randall because of the conditions of the parking 
lot asked Mr. Helquist if he would mind going to the lobby of the 
Public Safety Building, approximately 5 blocks away from Blue 
Mountain Foods to perform field sobriety tests. 
16. Trooper Randall and Officer Hall agreed that Officer Hall 
would stay at Blue Mountain Foods with the child and the car 
pending the outcome of the field sobriety tests. 
17. The Court finds that the stop by Officer Hall was a level 
two encounter. 
18. Field sobriety tests were performed by Officer Randall in 
the public portion of the Public Safety Building, to wit: the 
lobby, 
19. The Court finds that Mr. Helquist was not under arrest 
when he was brought to the lobby of the Public Safety Building to 
perform the field sobriety tests. 
20. Following Mr. Helquistfs performance of the field 
sobriety test, Officer Randall radioed Officer Hall and indicated 
that he was placing Mr. Helquist under arrest at which time Officer 
Hall made arrangements to take the child home and have the vehicle 
impounded. 
21. The Court finds that Officer's Randall and Hall by virtue 
of the call made to the Sheriffs Office, and the description of 
the individual and his activities at Blue Mountain Foods had 
reasonable suspicion to make the original stop and to do additional 
testing to check whether the occupant was under the influence. 
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22. The information that the individuals had together with 
the performance on the field sobriety tests gave Officer Randall 
probable case to make an arrest for DUI. 
23. The Court further finds that Mr. Helquist1s 
transportation to the Public Safety Building was not consensual, 
but he was asked by the officer to go to the Public Safety Building 
to do field sobriety tests, that he was not under arrest, that 
under the circumstances on this day and given the weather in 
Monticello at this time, it was not unreasonable for the officer to 
ask Mr. Helquist to accompany him to the Public Safety Building to 
perform the tests. 
24. Mr. Helquist was placed in the front seat of the patrol 
trooper's vehicle, he was not handcuffed. The indicia was arrest 
were not present. 
25. The Court finds that it was the intention of the officers 
that had Mr. ::^l~uist passed the field sobriety tests to return Mr. 
Helquist to his vehicle at the Blue Mountain Foods. 
26. Mr. Helquist was subsequently given an intoxilyzer test 
after he failed the field sobriety tests at the Public Safety 
Building and was detained by the officer and placed under arrest 
for DUI. 
DATED this 7jr\Ji day of Octomber, 1995. 
STATE OF UTAH W 
County of San Juan J 
LyJ^ R."Tenderson 
District Court Judge 
1
 Jkd^t ~ 
